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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2 (a)-3(2) (d) and (f) (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

Did the Prosecution show beyond a reasonable doubt

that the Defendant was in fact guilty of the crime of retail
theft?
Standard of Review: The standard of review is that, if
the Trial Court's Findings of Fact are erroneous or clearly
erroneous, said Findings of Fact should be set aside.
U.R.C.P. 52(a); State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
a.

The City of Orem alleges that the Defendant

committed the crime of retail theft by hiding some lip gloss
in her cart, and then leaving the store without making any
attempt to pay for the merchandise.
b.

At trial, the prosecution's witnesses

testified that the Defendant entered Albertson's, located at
1585 N. State Street, Orem, Utah.

Upon entering the store,

Defendant asked about exchanging some make-up, which the
clerk determined their store did not carry.

Defendant

continued shopping for other items, and while shopping, she
1

placed some Bonnie Bell lip light in her purse in the cart.
The clerk testified that he mentioned to Defendant that
Allen's down the street may carry the Defendant's particular
brand of make-up.

Defendant testified that she told the

clerk up front that she could not remember if she bought the
make-up at Macey's or Allen's.
c.

Defendant paid for several other items, but

failed to pay for the lip lights which the clerk had
observed her put in her purse.
d.
outside.

Defendant then left the store and was stopped

The lip lights were recovered from her purse.
e.

Defendant and the clerk both testified

that she had picked up several items at the store and placed
them in the basket.
f.

Defendant had, in the process of approaching

the check stand, picked up her day planner and began to
unzip it, and while opening it, put the makeup which she had
in her hand down.
g.

Defendant further testified that she had

bought several items, and did not notice the lip gloss which
had fallen into her purse, and simply forgot she had picked
up the lip gloss and needed to pay for it.
2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There was insufficient evidence to convict Defendant of
the crime of retail theft.

When asked about the indicia of

someone who is not intentionally taking an item from the
store, the store security officer described what Defendant
had been doing. Further, the jury was very clearly uncomfortable with their decision to find Defendant guilty-when
the jury members filled the jury survey forms, each jury
mentioned, and did not mention anything else, that they
appreciated Judge Backlund's comments about how difficult it
was to sit in judgment of someone else.

Had the jurors felt

comfortable with their decision, they should not have been
uncomfortable; there was, after all, no reasonable doubt
that the Defendant was guilty.

The fact that each juror

felt uncomfortable with the finding of guilty demonstrates
that they misunderstood the standard of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, or misapplied the standard.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DID THE PROSECUTION SHOW BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE
DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RETAIL THEFT?
It is well-established law in Utah that an appellate
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court affords great deference to a jury verdict.

The Utah

State Supreme Court very clearly stated this principle in
1991: "where there is any evidence, including reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from it, from which findings of
all the elements of the crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we will sustain the
verdict.

State vs. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994).

The jury in the present case found the Defendant guilty of
the crime of retail theft.

In order to do so, the evidence

must be beyond a reasonable doubt.

In this case, however,

there is definitely a question about whether the evidence
supports the verdict.
After receiving the jury's verdict, the Trial Court
stated:
I guess a comment might be appropriate. You've heard
enough from me today but I think this has been a difficult case for you and it's always difficult as now you
know how I feel probably sitting here in judgment of
people because that's what you've been doing today and
it's not an easy task and so I think I can understand
how you feel. . . I think you've done the very best job
that you can given the facts that were presented to you
and the law that you have to work with. Tr. 107.
Very clearly, the Trial Court felt uncomfortable with
the verdict reached by the jury.

In addition, the Court

continued just a few sentences later by saying the
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following:
And the jury has spoken and it's inappropriate for me
to comment on the verdict. This is a jury trial and
they've rendered the verdict so I'm not going to
comment whether I think it's a proper or improper
verdict. Tr. 108.
It should also be noted that the Trial Court, on its
own motion, decided to poll the jury, to determine if the
ver-dict of guilty was really what each individual juror intended.

The cumulative effect of the Court's actions is to

show that the Court obviously doubted the verdict, and
questioned whether the jurors really intended to find the
Defendant guilty.

This very clearly raises the question of

whether reasonable minds could and should have reached the
decision reached by the jury.
The evidentiary problems raised at trial, which raise
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the verdict, arise in the testimony of the prosecution's
witnesses on direct examination.

The second witness called

by the prosecution was Joshua Quarnberg, an assistant
manager at Albertson's.

At one point in his examination,

the Prosecutor asked Mr. Quarnberg "How do you decide
whether or not you're going to actually stop somebody?"
witness responded with the following:
Whether it appears to me whether they did it inten5

The

tionally to, to hide the item so that it wouldn't be
seen or whether they were looking for some place, you
know, they just didn't have room, they need that item.
. . . I do approach them if I do think that they didn't
intend on doing it, if you know, they just didn't think
about it, they thought, you know, their hands were
full. Tr. 55, 56.
Asked if he had actually stopped individuals who had concealed items without having them arrested, Mr. Quarnberg
"that would be in a case where their hands were full and
they just needed somewhere else to stick an item, you know,
so they stuck it in their pocket not intending to steal it
but, you know."

Tr. 56, 57.

The undisputed testimony of the Defendant fits exactly
the circumstances which Mr. Quarnberg says give an indication that the individual does not intend to steal the
item.

She entered the store with some of her own makeup,

hoping to make an exchange for a different kind of makeup.
Tr. 22, 41, 79.

When informed that Albertson's did not

stock that kind of makeup, the Defendant shopped for 10 to
15 minutes, selected some more makeup and other items to
purchase, and headed for the checkout.

Defendant began

fumbling with her dayplanner in order to get her money out
so she could pay for the items she had selected.

Tr. 81.

While trying to unzip her day-planner, Defendant flipped the
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lip gloss she had in her hand forward.

It fell into her

open bag, and the Defendant proceeded to the checkstand to
pay for her groceries.

At the checkstand, she did not put

the lip gloss on the conveyor for purchase.

Tr. 81-83.

Defendant paid about $20 for the groceries did purchase, in
cash, and testified that she had an additional $60 or so on
her at the time.

Tr. 84.

It is just important to note what

Mr. Quarnberg did not indicate had happened as to remember
what he did say happened.

He did not claim that the

Defendant was looking around to see if anyone was watching
for her.

He did not say she was looking for cameras.

did not move furtively or nervously in any manner.

She

What mr.

Quarnberg did testify to is that the Defendant walked past a
rack while she was fumbling with something in her hands.
She made no overt attempt to conceal the items, but instead
threw the items in front of her, into her open bag.
was still open at the checkout stand.

The bag

This fits exactly

with the actions that Mr. Quarnberg claims he uses to use as
an indication that an individual does not intend to steal
merchandise.

Further, her hands were full—she had her

dayplanner in her hands trying to unzip it so she could get
her cash out to pay for the merchandise she had selected.
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When stopped by Mr. Quarnberg after passing the checkout
stand, she did not try to deny the fact that she had unpaid
for merchandise, but immediately stated that she had
forgotten to pay for it.
The cumulative effect of the evidence presented is that
there was a reasonable doubt as to Defendant's guilt.

The

Court very clearly felt uncomfortable with the evidence,
and, as shown by the statements by the jurors in the survey
forms they returned to the judge, the jurors obviously felt
uncomfortable with their decision.

The problem is that they

did not recognize this discomfort as what it really was—a
reasonable doubt about the evidence and their decision.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Defendant believes that the
verdict of the jury should be overturned.

Very obviously,

reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict the jury
reached; even the jurors felt uncomfortable with their
decision.

In order to decide that Defendant was actually

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, a reasonable person had to
decide that Mr. Quarnberg's testimony was only partially
reliable.

If his testimony was only partially reliable, the

jury had to decide there was some reasonable explanation for
8

deciding to discount part of it.

There is nothing in the

record to support this decision.

If Mr. Quarnberg's

testimony is reliable, then based on his own statements, the
Defendant met every criteria he used to determine whether to
call the police on a person suspected of retail theft.
Defendant firmly believes that the jury could not have
reasonably found as they did, and that the verdict should be
overturned.
DATED this 24th day of September, 1999.

Randy M. Lish
Attorney for Defendant
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Addendum

There is no addendum of appendix submitted.
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